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Abstract
Concentration has increased since the 1980s in a variety of industries. Price-cost margins have
also increased over this period. These developments have raised concern about weakened competition
and resulting harm to consumers. Calls for tougher antitrust enforcement have become louder. Many
years ago Harold Demsetz (1973) cautioned against inferring weakened competition from a confluence
of rising margins and concentration. He argued that productivity differences across firms were a
potential “omitted variable.” This paper provides evidence on the interplay between concentration,
prices and productivity across several hundred US manufacturing industries over two 15 year periods
from 1982-2012. The consistent pattern is that high and rising concentration has been on average
associated with better productivity growth. Rising concentration has also been associated with
widening margins of price-cost margins. I show that widening margins generally, whether related to
concentration or not, are mainly driven by productivity gains, not prices. as in the competitive process
outlined in Demsetz (1973). Some skepticism about tougher antitrust policy may be warranted, since
this would risk harm to productivity without benefitting consumers.
JEL Classifications: L11, L40, D24, D4, K21
Keywords: Concentration, Prices, Productivity, Margins, Manufacturing, Antitrust Policy
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1. Introduction
Harold Demsetz (1973) made a seminal contribution to the literature on the effects of industrial
concentration. Much has happened since then - in the economy, in the policy arena and in academia. In
this paper I will reopen some of the questions Demsetz raised nearly 50 years ago, and I will show that
some of his answers are quite durable.
Within a decade of publication of Demsetz’s (1973) article on concentration and profits,
industrial concentration in the US began rising (Peltzman, 2014). This ended a long period of stability
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1982 antitrust policy on mergers also changed
decisively. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines of 1982 2adopted a less restrictive policy
focused mainly on mergers in very highly concentrated industries. That policy remains in place today.
Profit margins have also increased in the post-Guidelines period. 3 The relaxed merger policy, the
increased concentration and the economic effects thereof have come under increased scrutiny by
economists and also in the policy and political arenas. 4
This paper is about prices, costs and productivity in US manufacturing since the advent of the
merger guidelines. US manufacturing has been buffeted by many forces beside antitrust policy during
this period. These include the shift of economic activity toward services, increased imports of
manufactured goods and inputs (global supply chains), and so on. Manufacturing’s share of the total

See US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010) for the current version.
For the manufacturing sector, which is the focus of this paper, the National Income and Product Accounts show a
margin (gross output – (purchased inputs + employee compensation) of 8.6 percent of gross output in 1982. This
rises sharply to 15.6 percent by 1997 and then more gently to 18.2 percent in the subsequent 15 year period
ending 2012. (Data available at https://apps.bea.gov/histdata/index.cfm). This paper and much of the cited
literature use Economic Census data, which generally yield higher margin data, mainly because the Census-based
margin does not deduct the cost of purchased services and the value of non-payroll employee benefits such as
employee provided health insurance. However, both versions have the same trend – a sharp rise to the late 1990s
and a more gentle rise subsequently.
4
See.e.g., Galston and Hendrickson, 2018.
2
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economy has declined substantially. In 1982, manufacturing accounted for 19 per cent of both GDP and
non-agricultural employment. By 2012, the end of my sample period, these had declined to 12 and 9
percent respectively. The decline was especially pronounced in the second half of this period.
I focus on manufacturing because the relevant data are more complete and readily available.
Concentration, price, cost and productivity measures at industry levels roughly matching plausible
antitrust markets are available at sufficient frequency over most of the post- Merger Guidelines period. 5
However, manufacturing, especially in its current shrunken state, is not necessarily representative of the
larger economy. Another caveat is that nothing in this paper implies a causal link running from
concentration to performance measures like prices and productivity. This paper is essentially about
descriptive correlation among these variables. Indeed, I will argue, as did Demsetz (1973), that the
more plausible stories underlying these correlations are non-causal, in the sense that the correlations
are capturing common forces operating on the key variables.
The empirical work addresses a number of questions, such as: has increased concentration, on
balance, been associated with rising prices over this period? With widening price-cost margins? With
better or worse productivity performance? The answers to such questions are policy relevant even if
they are just describing what occurred in a particular period. Antitrust merger policy presumes a causal
link between concentration and prices. But the policy is entirely prospective. So risks of error are
inevitable: approving a merger that turns out to harm competition or rejecting a merger that would
have improved competition. A more restrictive policy, such as the one before 1982, increases the risk of
rejecting beneficial mergers. The more lenient recent policy increases the risk of approving harmful
mergers. Accordingly, in thinking about whether a more or less lenient policy is the better one, we want
Concentration data for some non-manufacturing industries, such as retailing, have also become available.
However, these are for the entire US, while many retail markets are local. By now some post 2012 manufacturing
data are also available, but this has not as of mid-2020 been integrated into the NBER’s manufacturing database,
which I use extensively. A major industry re-classification in 2012 also raises comparability issues.
5
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to ask which of the two kinds of error risk is likely to be the greater. Where we locate our priors on the
answer, depends on facts such as those summarized in this paper. For example, if increased
concentration since 1982 has usually been accompanied by increased prices, a reasonable reaction,
pending further investigation, would be toward more skepticism about the more permissive recent
merger policy.
The aggregated facts are not too helpful here. For example, from 1982 -2012 the relative price
index for all manufactured goods has declined even as concentration in the sector has increased.
Specifically manufacturing good prices increased by 1.7 per cent annually and 2.3 per cent annually for
all private industry. 6 However, the superior manufacturing price performance is essentially coming from
one sector – computers and electronics – with extraordinary productivity growth. As I show later, there
has been much variety across manufacturing industries in both the change in market structure and the
change in performance. This paper analyzes that variety. It is thus a throwback to an older, now
unfashionable empirical literature that uses cross-industry analysis to draw inferences about
competition.
This is not the place for a detailed review of that literature. 7 In the next section I try to give just
enough background to surface the main results and some of the problems that ultimately led industrial
organization economists elsewhere. I also try to connect the unfinished business from that literature to
more recent concerns about the link between market structure and industry performance. In this
discussion my debt to Demsetz (1973) will be obvious. His seminal insight was that the interplay of
structure and performance involved not just prices but also costs and productivity. I follow this
discussion with a description and analysis of the data on concentration and prices and productivity.

Based on deflators for gross output by industry available at https://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm
Schmallensee (1989) has a comprehensive review that is nearly complete, since the literature died out soon
thereafter.

6
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Finally, I analyze the recent behavior of price-cost margins, which was the specific outcome measure at
the heart of the Demsetz (1973) article, and I show some of the durable lessons of his analysis for a
recent revival of interest in price-cost margins as a proxy for monopoly pricing. Overall, the results
provide no compelling reason for tougher antitrust enforcement.

2. Cross Industry Analysis Then and Now

At one time – roughly 1950-1990 – analysis of cross-industry data was a staple of empirical
industrial organization. The most well-worn path involved estimating a cross-industry relationship
between some profitability measure, such as measured rates of return on capital or revenue-cost
markups, and some market structure measure, such as concentration ratios or, later on, a HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). The motive here was to implement the so-called “Structure-ConductPerformance” (SCP) paradigm associated with Edward Mason and his students in the founding
generation of Industrial Organization at Harvard. This was more a view than a well worked out theory.
Then as now there was no consensus oligopoly model. The SCP view was that more concentrated
markets (the S in SCP) bred weaker competition (the C) in a variety of ways that all pointed to higher
prices (the P). So the basic empirical model was P=f(S,…). This was usually estimated on cross-sections
of industry data, where price was proxied by some profitability measure, such as a price-cost margin 8.
The typical result was a positive correlation of profitability and concentration, and this was regarded as
confirming that prices were higher in more concentrated markets. Any possible connection between
concentration and the costs that also fed into the profitability measure was neglected.

The proxy was needed as a normalizing device, because price itself is incommensurable across industries. The
price-cost margin was conveniently available in Census cross-industry data. The typical margin calculation was the
value of output less material and labor costs as a percent of the value of output. With everything divided by
physical output, the margin is output price less unit labor and material costs as a percent of price. This markup
measure seemed like a reasonable proxy for the Lerner index of monopoly ((price-marginal cost)/price).
8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655762

6
That neglect ended with Demsetz (1973) who surfaced what we would call today a potential
omitted variable bias. He argued that a cost advantage for one or a subset of competitors would set off
a dynamic process consistent with the positive concentration-profitability correlation. It didn’t matter
whether the cost advantage was acquired by luck or skill. The advantaged firm(s) would attract capital
and expand their market share. So concentration would increase. At the same time industry level
measures of costs would fall and industry profitability would rise. In the simplest version of this story
price would remain unchanged at the marginal cost of the marginal (high cost) firm. 9 In this way, the
positive concentration-profitability correlation could be consistent with competition. Note that
concentration is not causing higher profitability in Demsetz’s story: they are moving together in
response to another force – differential efficiency across firms. 10
Demsetz’s differential efficiency story shows how industry rents are consistent with perfect
competition. The more efficient infra marginal firms garner the rents in part by taking market share
from the marginal firms. Perfect competition is a provocative counter to the then prevailing monopoly
rents interpretation of margin-concentration correlations, but the Demsetz process can also operate in
imperfectly competitive contexts. 11

The starting point here is constant cost competition. More complicated structures, such as rising long-run
industry supply, could yield higher industry output and lower prices. Industry aggregate profitability would
increase as long as any net output addition did not reduce prices enough to offset the lower costs.
10
An implication of the story is that if all surviving firms can eventually adapt to the initial productivity shock, the
correlation would disappear, in the sense that concentration might remain higher than before but profits would be
competed away.
11
For an example, consider canonical Cournot duopoly with linear demand and constant and initially equal
marginal and average costs. This produces equal sized firms, and so a baseline HHI of 5000. Inequality can
increase from this baseline only with some kind of differential cost shock. In this example, a Demsetzian efficiency
shock to one of the duopolists will raise the HHI and raise the industry margin, but price will decline. For example,
with demand given by P=100-Q and initial costs of 25 for each firm we get a baseline of P*=50, Q*=50 (25 per firm)
and a baseline margin of 50 percent of industry revenues (The P of 50 is a markup of 25 over the cost of 25).
Now suppose one duopolist (firm A) finds a way to produce at a unit cost of 15, or 10 less than previously.
In the new equilibrium Firm A will expand output by 6.67 to 31.67, B will contract to 21.67. So Q* rises to 53.33,
and, with B’s loss of market share the HHI will increase to 5176 from 5000. The increased Q* reduces P* from 50
to 46.67 but also increases the (quantity weighted) average margin to 59.2 percent from 50. In this case,
concentration and margins move up together, but price falls and so consumer welfare increases.
9
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Cross-industry tests of the SCP view ultimately faded from the literature, perhaps partly in
response to the “Demsetz critique.” 12 This was part of a general retreat from cross-sectional analyses in
industrial organization and elsewhere. Recently, however, in response to concern over increased
concentration and its effects, SCP-style analysis has been revived in several forms.
One is retrospective merger analysis, which examine price changes after mergers. These can be
case studies of a single merger, as in Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) or Luo (2014), or of samples of
mergers (Ashenfelter and Hoskin, 2010). But the salience of merger retrospectives comes from the
cross-section aspect. Specifically, Kwoka’s (2012, 2015) meta analyses find that prices typically increase
after mergers. Gaynor et al’s (2015) survey of correlations between price and concentration across
geographic health care markets reaches a similar conclusion. As these authors acknowledge, these
conclusions come with caveats. For example, the studies tend to focus on a few industries, such as
airlines and health care, with substantial merger activity. This raises issues like selection,
representativeness, and so forth. 13
Another relevant literature concerns the recent decline in business “dynamism.” Steve Davis,
John Haltiwanger and co-authors have shown that various measures of business turnover have been
declining over a long period. The measures include job creation and destruction, business entry and
exit, size transitions among firms and so on, all of which point to less turnover today than c 1980. (See
e.g., Davis et al, 2010, Davis et al 2011, Haltiwanger, 2012). These authors do not always connect any of

Note that any differential cost shock will increase the HHI in the canonical Cournot model. So, e.g., a
differential positive shock will raise the HHI and also price. Depending on demand conditions, such a shock can
raise or lower margins. This ambiguity illustrates Demsetz’s larger point, which is that there is no unambiguous
mapping from margins to price.
12
There were twists and turns along the way that I am ignoring here for brevity. For example, one response was to
regress direct measures of price on concentration. These could be prices for one good across differently
structured geographic markets (as in Weiss, 1989) or changes in price indexes correlated with changes in
concentration (as in Peltzman, 1977 and later on in this paper).
13
Airlines and health care were arguably responding to policy shocks (deregulation in the case of airlines and
growing importance of Medicare/Medicaid payments and rules in the case of health care).
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the dots between declining dynamism and concentration, productivity and prices. However, the
potential connections are clear, sometimes even explicit. In broad terms, the literature surfaces two
kinds of potential explanations for declining dynamism: Benign interpretations, in which better
outcomes go hand in hand with reduced turnover and opposite, malign interpretations. These also have
opposite implications for the correlation between market structure and performance.
Malign interpretations are motivated by the slowdown in productivity growth that has
accompanied the decline in dynamism. 14 Decker et al (2018) connect the two via diminished
responsiveness to shocks. They show that the process emphasized by Demsetz (1973) - reallocation of
market share toward more productive firms – has been an historically important contributor to
productivity growth. But their version has different implications for market structure, because the more
efficient firms tend initially to be small new entrants. These are generally riskier than established firms,
so many fail and exit. But this churn produces productivity growth because those who do succeed get
bigger and replace the established laggards. According to Decker et al (2018) the responsiveness of this
firm growth to the idiosyncratic productivity advantage has diminished. They do not identify specific
new “adjustment frictions” behind the slower responsiveness. However, the slower responsiveness will
tend to increase industry concentration, because the slower growth of efficient small firms will leave
larger market shares for the established (larger) firms. Accordingly, higher concentration will tend to be
correlated with lower productivity growth. (Again, this is not causal but a common reflection of the
enhanced adjustment frictions.)
A benign interpretation follows a similar logic but switches the firms with the productivity
advantage. Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) use the retail sector as an example. They cite data showing

For example, in the data I analyze later in the paper, multifactor productivity growth across 473 manufacturing
industries averages .8 per cent annually before 1980 and only .3 percent annually thereafter.
14
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increased productivity growth in that sector and connecting it to reallocation from established to newer
stores. The difference is that here the newer stores are bigger and owned by bigger firms such as “Wal-

Mart and other big-box firms [which] transformed supply chains, wholesale distribution, inventory
management, pricing, and product selection in recent decades.” (p10). In other words, the reason
smaller firms exited is that the new procedural and logistical practices in this industry require large
scale – both at the store and firm level- to be more efficient, but once implemented at scale they
deter (small scale) entry and speed (small scale) exit. The implication for the concentration –
productivity correlation is opposite to the malign story.
More recent literature examines these implications explicitly and generally finds support for
the benign interpretation. A common strand in papers such as Hsieh and Rossi-Hanberg (2019),
Ganapati (2019), Kehrig and Vincent (2018) and Autor et al (2019) is the Demsetz (1973) mechanism
of the more productive firm gaining market share, sometimes embellished by scale advantages in
implementing more productive techniques. One strand of this literature finds that information
technology adoption is an important source of the differential productivity advantage of large and
growing firms (Bessen, 2017; Calligaris et al, 2018). A less-than-benign variant locates the
large/growing firm advantage in growing regulation and resultant lobbying (Gutierrez and
Philippon, 2019), whereby increased regulation and lobbying deter entry and expansion of small
firms. 15

The implications of their argument for correlations of concentration and prices or productivity are mixed. A
regulatory shock to an industry increases costs and prices. It also increases concentration, because large firms
have lower compliance costs. On this account, prices and concentration are positively correlated. On the other
side, the shock is endogenous: more concentrated industries can better avoid regulation in the first place (via
lobbying etc). On this account, concentration and prices would be negatively correlated.
15
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Another recent literature (e.g.,De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Gutierrez and Philippon, 2017;
Barkai, 2020 ; De Loecker et al, 2020) revives the use of price-cost markups to imply monopoly rents.
These are mainly concerned with macro-economy trends, such as the decline in the labor share of GDP,
sluggish business investment, slower growth, etc. The common thread in this literature is the
presumption of the pre-Demsetz SCP literature that higher markups signal weaker competition.
The various stories about recent industrial history are not mutually exclusive. Both malign and
benign interpretations of business turnover imply increased market concentration and declining
measures of dynamism. Higher margins can signal greater efficiency in some industries and less
competition in others. In subsequent sections I try to let the data tell us whether on balance this
increasing concentration is associated with higher or lower productivity and prices. The next section
describes the data I use, and the subsequent Section 4 uses them to describe the connection between
concentration and prices and productivity over the whole of the post-1982 period. The literature that
revives margins-as-monopoly-rents raises more general questions, and I defer discussion of that work to
a separate Section 5.

3. Data on Productivity, Prices and Concentration
I match two data sources to produce two sub-samples of the period since 1982. Price and
productivity data come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, which at the time of
writing is available through 2011. 16 There are two versions of these data, one based on the 1987
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and the other on the 1997 North American Industrial

The data can be downloaded at http://www.nber.org/data/nberces.html. The database is a joint venture of the
National Bureau of Economic Research and the US Census’ Center for Economic Studies.
16
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Classification System (NAICS). Both are available annually from 1958. 17 Here I use SIC based data for
1982-1997 and NAICS based data for 1997 and beyond. These comprise two fifteen year subsamples of
the post 1982 period, 1982-1997 and 1997-2012, and they are henceforward referred to as the SIC and
NAICS samples or subsamples.
The data are at the 4 digit SIC or 6 digit NAICS level of classification, which gives over 450
industries in any year prior to 2012. For each industry, the database provides a variety of industry
summary data, such as shipments, payroll and employment, material purchases, etc. There are also
price indexes for shipments, materials purchased and investment goods as well as indexes of total factor
productivity (TFP). A TFP index is an output index deflated by an index of input quantities weighted by
cost shares. 18 I use the TFP4 index (or DTFP4, the change of ln(TFP4)) which has four inputs: production
labor, supervisory (non-production) labor, materials and capital goods. I also calculate a labor
productivity (output per hour worked) index, 19 as well as an index of the arguably exogenous
component of input prices, which is discussed later. 20
My goal is to describe the connection between industry concentration and productivity and
prices over long periods, specifically the 15 years spanned by both the SIC and NAICS samples. So I
matched the NBER-CES data to concentration data (HHIs) from the Census of Manufactures for the
terminal years of each sample. The HHIs for any Census are based on the industry classification for that
Census year. These classifications change over time.

The SIC was the operative classification system until 1997, when the NAICS took over. However, the NBER-CES
database reclassified manufacturing establishments into either NAICS or SIC industries to produce industry time
series going back to 1958 or forward to 2011 as needed.
18
See the documentation section at the NBER-CES link shown above for fuller explanation.
19
The data have hours worked by production workers and number of supervisory employees. The note to Table 1
describes how I estimated hours worked by supervisory employees.
20
In Section 5 on margins I also calculate and describe productivity and price indexes for labor plus material inputs.
This differs from TFP by excluding capital.
17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655762

12
NBER-CES industry data are based on a single classification, either the 1987 SIC or the 1997
NAICS. Accordingly, matching HHIs to NBER-CES data encounters various problems. 21 I leave details in
footnotes and focus on general issues arising from these classification changes. In many cases only
numbering and labeling changes, and for these there is no problem. Problems arise when products,
firms and establishments are moved from one industry to another. Simply deleting such industries
would substantially restrict sample sizes and introduce possible biases 22. Including such industries
requires industry data to be combined or separated or otherwise approximated to align HHIs with the
NBER-CES data. Resolving these matching problems inevitably introduces measurement errors.
The NAICS samples is the less problematic in this respect. The classification changed
substantially only in the 2012 Census (one year after the NBER-CES data end). This required rebasing all
the NAICS industry data to the 2012 classification. The 2012 NAICS changes reflect the shrinkage of
manufacturing, especially in industries like textiles, apparel, metal fabrication and the like where
imports now dominate. Around 100 industries were eliminated by combining the remnants into more
broadly defined aggregates. In the majority of these cases the combination just replaced all the 6 digit
constituents of a 5 digit NAICS industry with the 5 digit aggregate, and for these matching is
straightforward. 23 However, for 34 NAICS 2012 industries 1997 data had to be partly estimated. 24

There are also missing data problems, especially for a few highly concentrated industries where HHIs are
suppressed to maintain confidentiality. I estimated HHIs for these interesting cases from other available data, most
commonly by interpolating from other concentration data and HHI data in nearby Census years. In addition to the
HHI the Census gives 4, 8, 20 and 50 firm concentration ratios. These can be used to bound the HHI: the lower
bound can be obtained by assuming equal market shares among the largest four firms, the next 4 and so forth. The
upper bound can be obtained by assuming one large firm and then equal shares for firms 2 through 8, etc. Where
an HHI from a nearby year is available, I can locate the HHI within the permissible range for that year and then
assume the same location for the year where the HHI is missing. If no nearby year’s HHI is available, I use a
location for the HHI of a comparably concentrated industry within the same 2(3) digit SIC (NAICS) industry sector.
22
The classification changes respond to changes in the market, such as product innovation. Industries with stable
classifications tend to have less of such innovation.
23
We have 5 digit HHIs for both 1997 and 2012. For NBER-CES data, we can aggregate the 6 digit components
either directly or using output weights.
24
The 1997 NBER-CES data could be obtained directly by aggregating. However, the 1997 HHI was unavailable
directly for these 34 industries. A lower bound could be obtained as the weighted sum of constituent HHIs, where
21
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The SIC sample is more troublesome, because it involves two major changes. One is the switch
to NAICS in 1997, which required matching SIC based data to NAICS. The other is a major SIC
classification change in 1987, which required matching 1982 SIC data to the 1987 version. Well under
half the 1982 industries remain comparably defined in 1997. To avoid overly compromising sample size
I adopted a 90 percent plus rule: I retained an industry if in both 1982 and 1997 I could determine that
at least 90 percent of shipments came from establishments classified into the industry in the other
year.25
I dropped several semiconductor based industries and tobacco from both samples. 26 Some of
the key variables in these industries are several standard deviations away from the rest of the sample,
and this can distort comparisons across samples of the sizes I am working with. In the semiconductor
related industries Moore’s Law has resulted in exceptional rates of productivity growth and price

the weights are the squared shares of the constituent industries in the aggregate. This estimate is exact if all the
significant firms in one constituent industry are different from those in the other. If the firms overlap this estimate
is too small. From data on 5 digit industries and their 6 digit components, we can infer that the understatement is
on the order of 10-15%. Instead of just inflating estimates by a constant, I used a regression adjustment. First, for
industries with available data, the difference between known 5 digit HHIs and the weighted sum of 6 digit HHIs
was regressed on the log of 5 digit value of shipments per firm and the number of 6 digit industries in the
aggregate. (The latter two had positive coefficients. Aggregating more industries raises the odds that firms in one
of them will produce something in another industry, and bigger firms are more likely to produce multiple
products.). Then coefficients from this regression and 1997 x’s for the 34 industries with missing HHIs were then
used to calculate estimated adjustments to be added to the weighted sum of 1997 HHIs to obtain 1997 HHI
estimates for the NAICS 2012 industry definition.
25
That is, (shipments of the 1997 industry from establishments in the 1982 industry)/(total shipments of the 1997
industry) > .9 and (shipments of the 1982 industry from establishments in the 1997 industry)/(total shipments of
the 1982 industry) > .9. The necessary information comes from concordances available either from the NBER-CES
website or from the Bureau of Census website and also from US Census (2000). Since the SIC-NAICS matching uses
the 1987 SIC, industries with changed definition between 1982 and 1987 had to undergo two 90 percent plus tests.
These were retained if the product of the relevant ratios exceeded .9.
26
These were, for the SIC sample, all industries in SIC 357 Computer and Office Equipment and SIC 3674
Semiconductors and Related Devices as well as SIC 21 Tobacco. The deleted NAICS sample counterparts are NAICS
334111 Electronic Computer Manufacturing, NAICS 334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing and NAICS
334118 Computer Terminal et al Manufacturing, NAICS 334413 Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing
as well as NAICS 312230 Tobacco manufacturing.
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declines. Tobacco is dominated by the events surrounding the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement,
which resulted in exceptional price increases, especially in the NAICS sample period.
The preceding adjustments left a NAICS sample of 359 industries, which is essentially all of the
NAICS 2012 manufacturing industries aside from the tobacco and semiconductor based industries. The
SIC sample has 288 industries. This is around 60 percent of all contemporary industries and raises some
questions about representativeness and measurement error in the SIC sample. 27 Table 1 summarizes the
two samples.
The bottom panel of Table 1 (ignore lines 7 and 8 for now) captures the continual increase in
concentration over both sample periods. (The levels on line 6 are not comparable, because of the 2012
consolidation of NAICS industries) 28. The mean increase amounts around 17 percent of the average
level in the SIC sample and 12 percent in the NAICS sample As detailed in the next table, there are
roughly twice as many industries with increasing concentration as with decreasing concentration in both
periods. However, and though caution is warranted in making the comparison, even by 2012 few
industries have levels of concentration exceeding the Merger Guidelines red lines of 1800 or 2500. 29

For example, I assigned each industry the available HHI for the 1997 and 1982 industry definitions without
adjustment for industry size. However, HHIs will generally be larger if classification changes put 1982
establishments into a different 1997 industry, or vice versa. Also, where industries could be exactly matched by
aggregating whole industries (e.g., the 1997 industry is the sum of several 1982 industries) I used the weighted (by
squared industry shares) sum of constituent industry HHIs, which is also subject to error as discussed in n.23.
28
The 2012 consolidations increase industry size, which tends to reduce firm market shares and thus industry HHIs.
29
The current version of the guidelines sets a presumptive red line at 2500 and a pink one at 1800, which was the
previous red line. Mergers that push concentration beyond these triggers are likely to be challenged. These
numbers refer to antitrust markets as defined in preliminary analysis of the merger, and these need not coincide
with industries defined by the SIC or NAICS. As of 2012, 39 of 359 NAICS industry HHIs exceeded 1800 and 20
exceeded 2500.
27
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. Prices, Productivity and Concentration. US Manufacturing
Industries. NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples.
Variable/period

Units

Prices & Costs
1. price of shipments,
change per year
2. price of inputs,
change per year
Productivity
3. total factor productivity,
change per year
4. output per hour,
change per year
Concentration
HH Index
5. ___change over period
6. ___average level
HHI^.5
7. __change over period
8__average level
Number of Industries

NAICS Sample
Mean SD

SIC Sample
Mean
SD

ln x 100

1.98

1.58

2.07

1.04

ln x 100

2.30

0.83

2.01

0.51

ln x 100

0.10

1.53

0.67

1.17

ln x 100

2.72

1.79

2.45

1.53

units
units

95
781

511
736

142
822

509
683

units
units

2.00
25.0

7.37
12.0

2.43
26.0

7.20
11.4

359

288

Sources: shipment prices, input prices, productivity: NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
http://www.nber.org/data/nberces.html.
I use the two available versions of this database for the two samples. The SIC version is based on the
1987 Standard Industrial Classification and the NAICS version is based on the 1997 North American
Industrial Classification System. I use the SIC version for 1982-97 and the NAICS version for the
subsequent period. The NAICS database ends in 2011. Both databases have over 450 industries. The
smaller number of industries in my samples is due to a) differences between the 1982 and 1987 SICs, b)
the switch from the SIC to NAICS in 1997, c) the consolidation of NAICS 6-digit manufacturing
industries in 2012 and d) the exclusion of semiconductor based and tobacco industries as described in
the text
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Sample variables are related to variables in the NBER-CES database (NAMES in parentheses) as follows:
1. Shipment prices: ln of deflator for value of shipments (PISHIP)
2. Input costs: weighted average of hourly cost of production & supervisory labor, material cost deflator
(PIMAT) and deflator for investment goods (PIINV). Weights are average beginning period cost shares
(1980-82 and 1995-1997 respectively). Hourly labor costs are estimated at the 2 digit SIC or 3 digit
NAICS level. These are averages of 4 and 6 digit industry data on total payroll (PAY), production worker
wages (PRODW) , production worker hours (PRODH) and author's estimate of supervisor hours. This
estimate multiplies the number of supervisory employees (EMP-PRODE) by estimated hours per
supervisory employee. These are set at .92* (PRODH/PRODE) for non-durable industries and
.9*(PRODH/PRODE) in durables industries. These multipliers are from Bureau of Labor Statistics data on
hours by industry available from 2006 on at www.bls.gov. PAY and PRODW are grossed up to include
fringe benefits. the multiplier here come from the ratio of compensation to payroll for the industry's 2
digit SIC or 3 digit NAICS sector in the national income and product accounts found at
https://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
3. Total factor productivity: average annual DTFP4 (=change in ln of TFP4)
4. Output per hour: [value of production (VSHIP + change in INVENTories)/PISHIP]/ total hours, as
described in 2. above.
Concentration: US Bureau of the Census. Census of Manufacturing, Subject Series. Concentration Ratios
in Manufacturing, various years and formats. See text for description of matching of concentration data
to price and productivity data.
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The top panel of Table 1 summarizes output and input prices. On average, both prices are
increasing around 2 per cent a year nominally in both samples. 30The middle panel gives the growth rates
of two productivity measures – total factor productivity (TFP, or log output minus log of an index of
labor, material and capital inputs) and the more familiar labor productivity. Mean growth rates move in
different directions. Average TFP growth slows by half a percentage point in the NAICS period, but labor
productivity growth actually increases. This increase reflects a substantial shrinkage of the
manufacturing work force (over 3 per cent per year) in the context of a milder decline in output (around
a half per cent per year in this sample). The divergence between TFP and labor productivity reflects, in
part, the more capital intensive manufacturing sector that emerged as manufacturing declined. 31
There is considerable cross-industry variety in productivity growth, as indicated by the large
standard deviations in Table 1 (lines 3 and 4). For example, while TFP growth is lower on average in the
NAICS period around 30 percent of the NAICS industries have greater TFP growth than the mean SIC
industry before 1997. Moreover, the cross-industry variety widens in the NAICS period with standard
deviations of productivity growth around 30 log basis points higher in the NAICS period. This is not an
artifact of differences in sampling. 32
Cross-industry analysis might shed light on the decline in productivity, since a substantial part of
the sample is performing relatively well. The next section summarizes cross sectional patterns in these
data with a particular emphasis on co-movements between the concentration data on one hand and the

The higher input cost inflation in the NAICS sample (2.3 per cent annually) reflects a commodity price boom that
peaked toward the end of the period. This particularly affected some food processing, petroleum and
petrochemical and metal fabricating industries.
31
For example, in 1997 labor compensation was 38.2 percent of value added (the total of labor and capital
compensation) in manufacturing. By 2011, this had shrunk to 30.5 percent as much labor intensive production had
been shifted outside the US. There was also an increase in material input intensity related partly to the previously
noted commodity price boom.
32
The levels and changes of the relevant standard deviations are virtually identical in the full sample of SIC
industries to those in the sample used here.
30
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price/productivity data on the other. To repeat the obvious, such co-movements are descriptions, not
causal statements. They give answers to questions like: has higher concentration on balance been
associated with higher prices? If so, is this particularly true in already concentrated markets (as assumed
in the Merger Guidelines)? Is increased concentration (or high concentration) more consistent with a
benign or a malign interpretation of declining business dynamism?

4. Concentration, Prices and Productivity

Cross tabulations in Table 2 give a rough first cut of the relevant co-movements. The three
panels classify data by HHI change, HHI level and combination of these two. The columns give results for
two productivity measures (columns 3 - 8) and prices (columns 9-11). Cross tabulating by both change
and level of concentration is motivated by antitrust policy and ambiguity in some of the motivating
stories outlined above. 33 The important results are on the last line in each panel or sub-panel, which
gives the mean difference (DIFF) and its t-ratio in each outcome for the different market structures
under consideration.
The outcomes are annual averages over each sample period. These long fifteen year periods are
meant to capture the more permanent relationships that I want to focus on. Also, as a practical matter,
the higher frequency outcome data within sample periods are noisy in potentially misleading ways. 34

Merger policy tries to deter increases in concentration, but only when the level of concentration is or would
cross a threshold. One benign story about the same event would be that productivity improves when “best
practices” are applied at large scale (a level-of-concentration effect) and also when firms that discover these
practices increase their market share (a change effect).
34
Specifically, I found persistent negative autocorrelation for most every productivity growth or price change
series within the typical industry. That is, short period changes have temporary (or mis-measured) components
that tend to be subsequently reversed. The negative autocorrelation holds for changes over periods up to at least
four years, which suggests that even long sub-period data may have considerable noise.
33
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The differences in the price changes (columns 9-11) range on both sides of zero, and there is no
clear pattern. For example, in panel I increasing concentration seems to raise prices in the NAICS period
but not in the SIC sample. Contrary to typical intuition, large increases in concentration have no greater
(possibly a lesser) effect than small increases (line 4c). Panel III, which incorporates the Merger
Guidelines focus on both change and level, also shows little consistency. Within the more concentrated
industries, prices do rise more when concentration increases, but only for the NAICS period (line 3,
panel III). And, within both period, the price increases associated with rising concentration are about
the same for the less concentrated industries than for the more concentrated industries (line 5, panel
III). The lack of any clear connection between concentration and price changes, let alone one consistent
with the specific concerns of the Merger Guidelines, will be a consistent feature of these data.
The productivity data in columns (3) through (8) show a more consistent pattern that lends
some support to the benign view of concentration. With the conspicuous exception of TFP growth in
the SIC period, the relevant differences are well bounded away from zero in the benign direction. That
is, high and rising concentration tend to be associated with greater productivity growth. There is no
consistent overall effect from changes (line 3, panel I), but industries with large increases in
concentration (line 4c, panel I) as well as highly concentrated industries (line 3, panel II, or line 5 panel
III) tend to have superior productivity growth.
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Table 2. Cross-Tabulations of Productivity Growth and Price Changes by Change and Level of Concentration.
US Manufacturing. NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples

Concentration Variable and
Sample
(1)
I. Change in HHI
1. Increasing
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
2. Decreasing
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
3. DIFF:1-2
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample

N
(2)

Productivity Growth (ln x 100 per year)
Total Factor
Output per Hour
Mean SD or SE |t|
Mean SD or SE |t|
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

232
191

.086
.572

1.470
1.165

2.727
2.481

1.838
1.444

2.187
2.078

1.527
1.019

127
97

.122
.850

1.642
1.161

2.700
2.376

1.706
1.694

1.599
2.055

1.600
1.073

-.036
-.278

.169
.145

.027
.105

.198
.191

.588
.021

.172
.129

.405
.604

1.609
1.219

3.303
2.889

1.961
1.424

2.112
2.070

1.694
.915

-.232
.539

1.234
1.114

2.151
2.078

1.508
1.353

2.262
2.084

1.342
1.118

.637
.065

.188
.169

1.152
.811

.230
.201

-.149
-.014

.201
.148

4. Large v Small HHI Increases
a. Above Median Increase
___NAICS sample
116
___SIC sample
95
b. Below Median Increase
___NAICS sample
116
___SIC sample
96
c. DIFF: 4a-4b
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample

0.21
1.92

3.38
0.39

0.14
0.55

5.02
4.03
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Price Change (ln x 100 per yr)
Mean
(9)

SD or SE
(10)

|t|
(11)

3.43
0.16

0.74
0.10
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Table 2. (Continued)
N
II. Level of HHI
1. High (above median)
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
2. Low (below median)
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
3. DIFF: 1-2
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
III. Level & Change
1. High and Increasing HHI
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
2. High & Decreasing HHI
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
3. DIFF: 1-2
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
4. Low and Increasing HHI
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
5. DIFF:1-4
___NAICS sample
___SIC sample
Note:

TFP
Mean SD

t

Q /Hr
Mean

SD

t

P chg
Mean

SD

180
144

0.469
.719

1.698
1.270

3.115
2.794

1.990
1.605

1.963
1.931

1.739
.992

179
144

-.272
.612

1.233
1.059

2.318
2.097

1.464
1.371

1.995
2.208

1.399
1.063

.741
.107

.157
.138

.797
.697

.184
.176

-.031
-.277

.167
.121

103
96

.505
.598

1.675
1.21

3.261
2.943

2.042
1.397

2.283
1.950

1.646
0.922

77
48

.419
.961

1.738
1.364

2.916
2.497

1.913
1.938

1.536
1.894

1.778
1.129

.086
-.363

.256
.223

.345
.446

.299
.345

.747
.056

.257
.176

-.249
.545

1.177
1.123

2.299
2.014

1.536
1.343

2.111
2.205

1.426
1.099

.754
.053

.188
.169

.962
.929

.235
.198

.172
-0.255

.202
0.147

129
95

4.73
0.78

0.33
1.63

4.01
0.31

4.32
3.96

1.15
1.58

4.09
4.68

N=number of industries satisfying criterion indicated in column 1.
DIFF line shows difference in means, its standard error and the |t|ratio. |t|>2 shown in BOLD
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0.19
2.28

2.91
0.32

0.85
1.74
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The contrast between the productivity and price effects hints at another feature of subsequent
data. Productivity growth implies lower costs. So if there are benign productivity effects from
concentration but no price effects, the implication is that the cost effects are offset by rising margins.
This is the possible dilemma for antitrust merger policy raised a long time ago by Oliver Williamson
(1968). It is also the heart of the Demsetz (1973) critique of inferring monopoly rents from price-cost
margins.
Subsequent tables refine these cross-tabs by allowing concentration to be continuous and by
taking account of some industry background conditions. 35 Table 3 summarizes the connection between
productivity and concentration, while Table 4 does the same for prices. In Table 3 the dependent
variables are average annual growth rates of TFP and labor productivity. The independent variables are
the level and change of concentration. For this and subsequent tables, concentration is measured as the
square root of HHI. This transformation removes most of the extreme skewness in both the level and
change of the HHI. 36 (Summary statistics for the transformed variables are on lines 7 and 8 of table 1.)
Each triplet of regressions in Table 3 begins with one that includes only the HHI level and
change on the right. The second regression adds sector (SIC 2 digit or NAICS 3 digit industry) fixed
effects, and the third adds interaction between high and rising concentration. The fixed effects are
meant to capture background conditions affecting productivity and concentration over broad groups of
industries (e.g., food products), so the regressions then capture the correlations across the industries

These can be troublesome if they are correlated with concentration. For example, the significantly higher price
change for increasing concentration industries in the NAICS period (panel I, col 11) is driven by a rise in the world
price of crude oil. This is a significant input for a variety of petroleum and chemical product industries. As a group
these industries also saw above average increases in concentration. As will be seen, the apparently significant
difference disappears once account is taken of input prices.
36
The HHI summarizes squared shares, so large shares (or changes in shares) are overweighed. The result is a long
right tail in the cross-industry HHI (and change in HHI) distribution, which violates typical Gaussian assumptions.
The skewness is reduced by taking square roots. (A log transformation also accomplishes this, but at a cost of overemphasizing inconsequentially large percentage changes in very unconcentrated markets). However, I should also
note that untransformed HHIs yield results similar to those subsequently reported.
35

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655762

23
within these groups (i.e., across dog and cat food, confectionary products, etc.). The interaction of the
change with levels of concentration addresses the central distinction in the Merger Guidelines.
The results in Table 3 reinforce the cross-tabs. Again with the exception of TFP growth in the SIC
sample, both the level and change of concentration tend to be positively correlated with productivity
growth. This is true across the whole sample and within industry sectors. There is no meaningful
difference between effects of changes in more or less concentrated markets. The implied magnitudes
can be substantial. For example, consider a NAICS industry that begins the period with concentration
one standard deviation below the mean and ends with concentration one standard deviation above the
mean. The NAICS regression (2) coefficients would imply an improvement in TFP growth of .37 standard
deviations, which exceeds the mean slowdown of TFP growth between the two sample periods. 37
Table 4 is in two parts (4A and 4B) and explores the interaction of prices, productivity and
concentration. The dependent variable here is the average annual log percentage change in the price of
shipments. Aside from sector fixed effects, there is only one plausibly exogenous control. This is the
average annual change in an input cost index, which is a weighted average of labor, material and capital
good prices. Details are in the note to Table 1. The weights are cost shares at the beginning of each
sample period, so they are unaffected by (possibly endogenous) within-period changes in cost shares.
Also, to avoid issues about (also possibly endogenous) division of value added between labor and
capital, I use sector wide rather than industry specific labor costs. 38 Table 4A shows unconstrained

The change would be +12 units and it would raise the average level (which is the average of beginning and
ending value) by 6 units. The coefficients multiplying these changes (.033 and .028 respectively) yield a sum of
+.564 log percentage points of TFP growth, which is 37 percent of the standard deviation (1.528 points). In HHI
units, the change is around 600 points, or a little over one standard deviation of the sample average change.
38
A part of the old cross-industry structure-performance literature argued that rents from concentration were
shared between labor and capital. See Schmallensee (1989, p990) for a summary. Another issue arises from firm
ownership and organization. Management or family owned firms, especially those organized as pass-through
entities (S-corps), have discretion in allocating value added between wages and profits.
37
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Table 3. Productivity Growth and the Change and Level of Concentration.
US Manufacturing. NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples
Independent Variables
and Sample

Total Factor Productivity
Growth(x100)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Coef |t| Coef |t| Coef
|t|

1. Change in HHI ^.5
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample
a) change in high HHI
industries
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample
b) change in low HHI
industries
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample
2. Average Level of
HHI^.5
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample
3. Industry fixed effects?
___NAICS sample (3 digit)
____SIC sample (2 digit)
Summary Statistics
adj R^2
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample
SEE
___NAICS sample
____SIC sample

.026
.004

.035
.004

Labor Productivity Growth (x100)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Coef |t| Coef
|t|
Coef
|t|

2.5

.033

3.1

.046

3.7

.059

4.9

0.4

.014

1.4

.023

1.9

.041

3.4

5.5
0.7

.028
.005

4.0
0.7

.031
.013

2.6
1.2

.063
.046

4.8
1.8

.047
.019

1.9
0.9

.037
.029

1.3
3.8

.029
.005

4.0
0.8

.039
.029

4.9
3.8

.038
.035

5.0
4.6

.040
.029

5.1
3.8

no
no

yes
yes

yes
yes

no
no

yes
yes

yes
yes

.09
<0

.14
.13

.14
.13

.09
.08

.22
.24

.22
.23

1.46
1.17

1.41
1.09

1.41
1.09

1.71
1.47

1.58
1.34

1.58
1.34

|t|>2 showin in BOLD
NAICS sample is 359 industries
SIC sample is 288 industries
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estimates of the effect of this exogenous cost shifter. These are always important empirically, and the
coefficients are often around the benchmark of +1 implied by constant cost competition.
Table 4A is in two parts. One controls only for input costs and another adds productivity variables. The
key results can be gleaned from the even numbered regressions – (2), (4) and (6) – which include sector
fixed effects. (The odd numbered regressions show that basic results hold between as well as within
sectors and that there is, again, no consistent interaction between the change and level of
concentration.) The important contrast is between regression (2), on one hand, and (4) and (6) on the
other. Without a productivity control concentration effects on prices are small and weak statistically.
For example, the regression (2) coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase in the
concentration variable is associated with around a 5 per cent standard deviation increase in the price
measure in either sample. However, when productivity controls are added, as in regressions (4) and (6),
the concentration effect becomes more meaningful statistically and economically; the marginal
concentration effects here are roughly triple those in column (2). 39

39

All the regressions also control for the level of concentration, but this does not matter in any consistent way.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655762

26

Table 4A. Prices, Productivity and Concentration. US Manufacturing. NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples
No Productivity Control
(1)
(2)
(3)
Coef |t| Coef |t| Coef |t|

(4)
Coef |t|

Productivity Control
(5)
(6)
Coef |t| Coef |t|

___NAICS sample

1.079

12.9

.693

5.6

.693

5.6

1.146

10.9

1.149

____SIC sample
2. Productivity growth x
100

0.956

9.0

.999

7.1

1.006

7.1

.849

8.1

.857

Independent Variables
and Sample

(7)
Coef
|t|

1. Change input cost x 100

(productivity measure)

TFP

10.9
8.1

.706
.828

6.9
6.6

.710
.836

6.9
6.7

q per
hr
-.436
-.325

12.7
9.1

q per
hr
-.437
-.325

13.7
14.8

12.7
9.1

.037
.019

4.6
2.8

2.8
1.7

.039
.017

4.5
2.2

1.5
2.1

.027
.032

1.5
2.1

.007
.006

1.4
1.4

TFP

___NAICS sample

-.541

13.8

-.541

____SIC sample

-.545

14.8

-.546

Concentration (HHI^.5)
3. Change
___NAICS sample

.009

1.0

.012

1.2

.023

3.1

____SIC sample
3a Change in High Conc
Ind

.005

0.6

.006

0.7

.014

2.3

___NAICS sample

.012

1.1

.023

____SIC sample

.003

0.3

.011

___NAICS sample

.012

0.5

.026

____SIC sample
4 Level (average for
period)

.018

1.0

.027

3b Change in Low Conc Ind

___NAICS sample

.006

1.0

-.01

1.6

-.01

1.6

.008

1.5

.008

____SIC sample

-.006

1.3

-.004

0.7

-.003

0.5

-.002

0.4

-.001

1.5
0.2

.008
.005

1.5
1.2

5. Fixed effects
____NAICS 3 digit ind

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

____SIC 2 digit ind

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

___NAICS sample

.34

.41

.41

.63

.62

____SIC sample

.23

.28

.28

.60

.61

___NAICS sample

1.29

1.21

1.21

.97

.97

____SIC sample

0.91

0.88

0.88

.65

.65

yes
yes

yes
yes

.60
.45

.60
.45

.99
.77

.99
.77

Summary Statistics
adj R^2

SEE

Dependent variable in all regressions is average annual change in ln price of shipments x 100.
Input cost, TFP, q per hr as described in Table 1
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So the main message in Table 4A is that once the change in the level of costs is comprehensively
controlled – the upward shift due to input prices and the offsetting downward shift due to productivity
growth40 – the margin of price over cost has widened where concentration has increased. The hitch in
attributing this wider margin to greater market power is that, as Demsetz (1973) warned and as seen in
Table 3, the level of costs may not be independent of the concentration increase.
This hitch also creates a potential estimation issue. In principle a point of TFP growth shifts
costs down as much as a point of input cost growth shifts costs up. This implies equal and opposite
signed coefficients on the two in regression (4) or (5). Instead we find somewhat smaller TFP effects and
(t-test not shown) we can comfortably reject the null. Table 4B imposes equal and opposite signs on the
input cost and TFP measures as robustness tests. The first two regressions in this table impose a
benchmark of textbook constant cost competition – i.e., prices completely determined by the level of

Conceptually only TFP growth provides a comprehensive cost proxy. Labor productivity affects costs also, but
the magnitude depends on labor’s cost share. On the other side, there are measurement issues unique to TFP,
such as treatment of the capital cost share as a residual and the exclusion of user costs from the price index. I
include the mis-specified regressions (6) and (7) to show that the pattern of results holds with either productivity
measure.

40
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Table 4B. Prices, Productivity and Concentration. Constrained Estimates. US Manufacturing.
NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples
Baseline Constraint-->
Independent Variables and
Sample

Constant Cost Competition
(1)

Equal & Opposite Effects of Productivity
and Input prices

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coef

|t|

Coef

|t|

Coef

|t|

Coef

|t|

___NAICS sample

1

na

1

na

.556

13.5

.556

13.5

____SIC sample
2. Productivity growth x
100

1

na

1

na

.585

17.2

.587

17.2

___NAICS sample

-1

na

-1

na

-.556

13.5

-.556

13.5

____SIC sample
Concentration (HHI^.5)
3. Change

-1

na

-1

na

-.585

17.2

-.587

17.2

___NAICS sample

.041

4.5

.032

4.1

____SIC sample
3a Change in High Conc Ind

.019

2.6

.015

2.6

1. Change input cost x 100

___NAICS sample

.038

3.0

.030

3.6

____SIC sample
3b Change in Low Conc Ind

.016

2.0

.013

2.0

___NAICS sample

.051

2.5

.041

2.3

____SIC sample
4 Level (average for period)

.036

2.2

.027

2.1

___NAICS sample

.020

3.4

.020

3.4

.005

1.0

.006

1.0

____SIC sample
SEE

.001

0.2

.002

0.5

-.002

0.6

-.014

0.8

___NAICS sample

1.18

1.18

1.02

1.02

____SIC sample

.82

.82

.66

.66

Dependent variable in all regressions is average annual change in ln price of shipments x 100.
Productivity variable in all regressions is TFP growth x 100.
All regressions include fixed effects for naics 3 digit or SIC 2 digit industry groups.
na=not applicable. R^2 not calculated.
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costs in the long run, which implies coefficients of +1 and -1 on the input cost and TFP changes
respectively. The last two regressions impose the looser constraint that the two coefficients should be
equal and opposite signed, as might be implied by, say, imperfect competition. 41 The constrained
regressions yield the same pattern of results (and similar magnitudes) as in Table 4A – i.e., significant
price effects of changed concentration when holding changes in input costs and productivity constant.
In sum, increased concentration tends to be associated with little net change in output price,
faster productivity growth and, consequently, wider price-cost margins. I defer discussion of the
relevant magnitudes to the concluding section. The next section discusses and analyzes price-cost
margins more generally – i.e., independently of any association with concentration.

5. Margins and Monopoly
The use of price-cost margins to proxy for non-competitive pricing has recently been revived
(e.g.,De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Gutierrez and Philippon, 2017; Barkai, 2020 ; De Loecker et al,
2020). The failure of this literature to engage the Demsetz critique has been noted (Berry et al 2019).
Heretofore I have been following Demsetz’s original concern with using margins as a left hand side
variable in regressions on market concentration. But the Demsetz critique is more general. It is about
the information conveyed by price-cost margins.
Margins measure a wedge between price and a unit cost. When margins are used as a proxy for
monopoly pricing there is a perhaps implicit assumption that the margins are being driven by output
prices, with costs either unaffected or part of the noise. This is true whether the application is a margin-

41

For example, linear firm demand would imply coefficients of +.5 and -.5 (absent cross-firm price effects).
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concentration regression in the SCP heyday or, as more recently, a monopoly explanation for some
ailments of the macro-economy. This assumption leads to statements such as:
“… there has been a steady rise in market power since 1980, from [markups of] 18% above cost
to 67% above cost. Over a 35 year period, that is an increase in the price level relative to cost
of 1% per year.” (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017, p1)
The numbers work out, given the assumptions. But what if the higher markups are due to lower unit
costs rather than higher prices?
Demsetz’s answer was that cost-driven markup increases were not only conceivable but could
emerge from a competitive process. Therefore, without further investigation, there is no basis for
inferring more monopoly pricing from higher markups. Demsetz’s point goes beyond his particular
application to the empirical SCP literature. Any unit cost shock that is uneven across firms can affect
industry margins without a change in the state of competition. 42 It is worth an arithmetic detour to spell
out what industry margins consist of. Then I will use the arithmetic to examine what has been driving
margins in the recent past and what this might imply for competition and monopoly.
For convenience I start with the margin defined as:
(1)

R = VPROD / LMCOST

where,
VPROD = value of production
LMCOST= labor + material cost.

For example, suppose, as in Decker et al (2018) that small firms with favorable cost shocks expand. The initial
impact on concentration could well be negative, since the expanding smaller firms would be taking market share
from the less innovative larger firms. Here the industry margin would rise as concentration fell.
42
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The difference between numerator and denominator is the markup over cost commonly used in
empirical work. It represents the part of value added available to non-labor claimants such as owners
and creditors. By dividing numerator and denominator by output (X), R can be expressed as:
(2)

R = P ( X ) / [ LMCOST / X ] ,

where,
P(X) = price of output (=VPROD/X)
LMCOST/X = unit labor + material cost.
When the two terms in the denominator of (2) are each divided by some index of labor and material
input (LM), unit labor and material cost can be expressed as:
(3)

[ LMCOST / X ] = P ( LM ) / LMP ,

Where,
P(LM) = price of a unit of labor and material input (=LMCOST/LM) , and
LMP = labor and material productivity (LMP) = X/LM, or output per unit of labor and material input.
Combining (2) and (3) and using lower case letters to denote the change in logs, we get
(4)

r =p ( x) − p (lm) + lmp ,

So (4) tells us that margins can increase if output price increases or if the price of inputs falls or if labor
and material productivity improves.
Equation (4) is an arithmetic definition, but it provides a framework that can help distinguish
two views of what drives margins: a “monopoly pricing” view and a “Demsetzian” view. The monopoly
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pricing view is that margins are driven by p(x), the first term in (4). In this view high and rising margins
signify high and rising prices relative to given costs. Costs are given in the sense that some variation in
market power is driving the margins in the long run, and technology and input prices are givens. In
empirical applications the last two terms in (4) are implicitly part of the noise (with p(x) on the left and r
on the right). The monopoly pricing view of margins underlies the old SCP (structure-conductperformance) empirical literature: something like R was the y-variable, proxying for output price, and
market concentration was the x- of-interest. But the monopoly pricing view of margins is more general
than that particular linkage. Anything that weakens competition – e.g., it could be more relaxed
restrictions on inter-firm cooperation or on anti-competitive vertical restrictions or, as later on in the
SCP literature, technological barriers to entry – would raise output prices and, thereby, margins The
recent revival of margins-as-monopoly exemplified by the above quote from De Loecker and Eeckhout,
2017 is more about a general weakening of competition that includes, but is not limited to, increased
concentration.
The Demsetzian view focuses on the last two terms of (4) (or the denominator of (2)) and, in
particular, how they are linked to firm heterogeneity. In purest form output price is given, in the sense
that it is the competitive price that covers the costs of the marginal firm. The reason margins vary is that
some firms can combine inputs more efficiently (or adapt better to input costs). Their costs are lower
than the marginal firm’s costs. Demsetz (1973) emphasized how these low cost, infra-marginal firms
would gain market share and so induce the observed correlation between margins and concentration in
a competitive world. Most of this paper follows Demsetz’s focus on the market structure aspect as well.
But the Demsetzian view is also general. Anything that widens or narrows the cost advantage of inframarginal firms will translate directly into industry average margins. This would be so even if the
implications for market structure are different from those central to Demsetz (1973). For example, the
small firm dynamism emphasized in Decker et al (2013) has a changing cast of small firms and new
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entrants as the infra-marginal firms and the larger established players as the marginal firms. This is
different than the once-and-for-all shock to one firm that Demsetz (1973) emphasized. More
“dynamism” (more or better innovative small firms) would widen industry margins and perhaps reduce
concentration. 43 The essence of the Demsetzian view is that margins reflect the different costs of
marginal and infra-marginal firms in a mainly competitive world.
The two views have different implications for empirical counterparts to the variables in equation
(4). While (4) is a mathematical definition, the relative importance of the three right-hand terms can
vary. Specifically, if industry margins increase is this, as in the monopoly view, primarily because prices
are rising? Or is it, as in the Demsetzian view, primarily because of more favorable cost/productivity
conditions for some firms? Or where between these extremes does the truth lie?
The answers cannot definitively rule out one or another interpretation. For example, it is
conceivable that margins driven entirely by costs could reflect market power. But then it would have to
be that in industries with falling costs market power has risen, while in industries with rising costs
market power has fallen. And in each case the changed market power has exactly offset the cost
changes. Occam’s razor would seem to cut in favor of the Demsetzian view here.
Table 5 shows the margin decomposition in equation (4) for the manufacturing data since 1982.
The results favor the Demsetzian view. Indeed, output prices have played no role in driving margins
over the whole post 1982 period. The dominant force has been productivity growth. The table divides
both the NAICS and SIC samples into groups of industries with rising or falling margins. Margins

If the small efficient firms taken as a whole gain market share. This need not happen if there is enough turnover
(“churn”) among the innovative small firms. In Peltzman (1977) I found that large decreases in concentration, as
well as large increases, were correlated with lower prices; this lent some support to a more nuanced view of the
size of infra-marginal firms.
43
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Table 5. Change in Price-Cost Margins and Components.
US Manufacturing. NAICS (1997-2011) and SIC (1982-1997) Samples
Industries With:
All
Industries
(1)
Mean
(SD)
N=465
1.439
(.273)
1.86
(11.91)
26.72
(21.88)
42.30
(13.47)
17.44
(21.33)
-0.76
(24.34)
N=447
1.372
(.228)
8.60
(9.45)
31.18
(15.52)
34.51
(9.87)
11.93
(15.03)
9.49
(17.61)

Variable & Sample

A. NAICS sample
1. Price-Cost Ratio (PCR)
2. Change lnPCR(x100):1997 to 2011
Components of line 2.:Change in ln(x100) of
3. Price of shipments
4. Price of materials+labor
5. Productivity of materials+labor
addendum: change in tfp (lnx100)

B. SIC sample
1. Price-Cost Ratio (PCR)
2. Change lnPCR(x100):1982 to 1997
Components of line 2.:Change in ln(x100) of
3. Price of shipments
4. Price of materials+labor
5. Productivity of materials+labor
addendum: change in tfp (lnx100)

Difference

Increasing
Margins
(2)
Mean
(SD)
N=263
1.459
(.29)
9.18
(9.05)

Decreasing
Margins
(3)
Mean
(SD)
N=202
1.414
(.25)
-7.65
(7.71)

27.41
(20.69)
43.04
(12.51)
24.81
(21.04)
5.93
(25.10)

25.82
(23.33)
41.33
(14.62)
7.85
(17.59)
-9.45
(20.31)

N=381

N=66

1.374
(.232)
10.84
(8.21)

1.359
(.200)
-4.32
(4.42)

.015
0.6
15.16
14.6

31.50
(15.08)
34.05
(9.94)
13.39
(14.34)
11.31
(16.65)

29.35
(17.87)
37.12
(9.13)
3.45
(16.20)
-1.03
(19.34)

2.15
1.0
-3.07
2.3
9.94
5.1
12.34
5.4
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(4)=(2)-(3)
Mean
|t|
.045
2.0
16.83
21.2
1.59
0.8
1.71
1.4
16.96
9.2
15.37
7.1

35
(Notes to Table 5): Source: NBER-CES Database (see note to Table 1). The samples include all
manufacturing industries except the tobacco and semi-conductor related industries specified in the note
to Table 1.
PCR is as defined in the text. See notes to Table 1 for details on other variables.
Price of materials + labor is an index of labor and material prices using beginning of period expenditure
weights. It differs from the input cost index in previous tables by excluding capital input prices.
Productivity of materials+labor is an index of output (deflated VPROD) divided by an index of
labor+material input (labor + material expenditures deflated by the labor+material price index). The last
line in each panel shows averages for DTFP4 in the database for comparison.
Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. In column 4 absolute t-ratios are shown below means.
t-ratios > 2 are shown in BOLD.
Within each panel and column line 2= line 3 - line 4 + line 5 up to rounding error
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grew more in the SIC period (1982-1997) than the NAICS period (1997-2011) (see line 2, column (1)). So
there are fewer industries with falling margins in the SIC sample (66 v 202 in the NAICS sample), which
raises questions about statistical power and representativeness in that sample. Nevertheless, the two
samples tell a fairly similar story. Average margins are about the same in rising and falling margin
industries in both periods (line 1). The mean difference between rising and falling margin industries
(line 2, column (4)) is substantial – well over a standard deviation of the whole sample. Lines 3 to 5 then
decompose line 2 into the components in equation (4). Two results stand out. One is the complete
irrelevance of output prices, statistically and economically, to changing margins. Nominal output prices
rose on the order of 30 log points on average in both periods, with no meaningful difference between
industries with rising and falling margins. This should come as a surprise to those used to thinking of
rising margins as a proxy for rising prices. The other outstanding result is the importance of productivity
growth. The particular measure in the table (output per unit of material and labor input) accounts for all
of the differential margin growth in the NAICS period (compare line 5 to line 2 in column (4)).
Productivity accounts for around 2/3 of the differential margin growth in the SIC period, with the
balance accounted for by differences between output and input price growth. 44
The table shows similar results for the more conventional total factor productivity measure.

This outsize importance of productivity growth in margin changes should also be a surprise to
those with monopoly-pricing priors about margins, and it suggests caution about policies suggested by
such priors. Productivity growth has been weak over the entire post-1980 period – zero TFP growth

In isolation that difference could favor a monopoly view of margins. But it is not repeated in the NAICs period.
And there is also a Demsetzian interpretation: suppose the marginal firm is one that is less affected by industry
average input costs (uses different technology than most firms). Then infra-marginal firm costs and margins will
vary with input prices, because output prices are relatively unaffected.
44
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after 1997 and less than one per cent annually from 1982-1997 in my data. 45 Notably, any and all TFP
growth in manufacturing since the 1980s has been coming from industries with increasing margins. In
the most recent period, productivity has actually been falling in the declining margin industries. Taken
together with the (non) result on output prices, this strong connection between margins and
productivity growth lends weight to a Demsetzian interpretation where industry margins reflect the
dynamism of the infra-marginal firms, not the firms at the price-determining margin.

6. Summary and Implications
Industrial concentration has been increasing over the entire period since the promulgation of
the Merger Guidelines in 1982. It is unclear whether this trend has yet run its course. There is concern
that higher concentration has led to weaker competition as evidenced, e.g., by higher prices in the wake
of many mergers. There is also concern about the possibly reinforcing interplay between rising
concentration and declining business dynamism and productivity (e.g., Council of Economic Advisers,
2016). I have tried to inform these concerns by describing salient trends in one sector – US
manufacturing – over the long period since the 1982 Merger Guidelines.
Specifically, instead of looking only at mergers in a few industries, I ask some more general
questions: is higher concentration usually associated with higher prices across many manufacturing
industries? I also ask about the productivity-concentration nexus. Have the newly concentrated
industries been more or less productive than other industries? And how does the answer fit with the
previous one about prices? These are old questions in industrial organization. The price question
dominated empirical organization for a long time. The productivity question was raised forcefully by
Harold Demsetz in 1973. Interest in the price-cum-productivity proxy that Demsetz and the others were

45

Which, recall, excludes the exceptional productivity growth of semiconductor related industries
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concerned with back then– price cost-margins – has also been revived, because margins have been
increasing along with concentration. So I also investigated the relative importance of the price and
productivity components of margin changes since 1982.
The results tell a broadly consistent story in which output prices play a minor role. For example,
real prices are about as likely to rise as fall in more concentrated industries. This seems to be the
resultant of opposing tendencies that roughly cancel: the more concentrated industries seem to be
more productive but firms in these industries also seem to retain most of the resulting efficiency gain in
higher margins. Subsequent results on margins shows that this tendency is general, not just limited to
industries with increased concentration.
There is variety in the underlying results depending on sample periods, definitions of
productivity and the like. However, table 6 summarizes the central tendency with respect to market
structure. Here I walk through two scenarios - one involving an increase in concentration and the other
comparing industries with different levels of concentration. Table 6 does this separately for each 15
year sample period, using results from the previous tables, as indicated in column (1), as the steps in this
walk. In panel I, I work through the case of a one standard deviation increase in the change of
concentration (which translates into around 90 extra HHI points in either period), and in panel II I
compare industries with average and one SD above average concentration (a difference that works out
to around 700 HHI points). To keep things simple I’ll focus on the results involving TFP growth and
measure everything in SD units.
Panel I starts with the productivity effect associated with the increased concentration (A.1):
+.161 SD extra TFP growth in the NAICS period. The relevant price regression implies a .085 SD price
reduction (panel I, B.1) from this much TFP growth. Then I add back the markup effect (i.e., price effect
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Table 6. Summary of Productivity and Markup Components of Price Changes
Associated with Changes and the Levels of Concentration.
US Manufacturing. NAICS (1997-2012) and SIC (1982-1997) Sample
NAICS Sample
Counterfactual and Components of
Price Change
I. Change in HHI^.5 increases by 1 SD
from sample mean
A. Productivity effect
1) on TFP growth
2) on output per hour growth
B. Implied effect of productivity
change on price
1) TFP change
2) q per hour change
C. Markup effect on price
(for given productivity)
1) TFP change
2) q per hour change
D. Sum of productivity and
markup effects on price
a) TFP basis=C.1)-B.1)
b) q per hour basis=C.2)-B.2)
c) from regression excluding
productivity effect

Source
:Table
(Regression)
(1)

change
amount
(2)

1

+7.37

3(2)
3(5)

.246
.432

.161
.241

.098
.295

.084
.193

4(4)
4(6)

-.133
-.188

-.085
-.119

-.053
-.096

-.052
-.093

4(4)
4(6)

.170
.273

.108
.173

.101
.137

.097
.132

.036
.084

.023
.054

.047
.041

.046
.039

.088

.056

.043

.042

4(2)

change
in SD
units
(3)

SIC Sample
change
amount
(4)

change
in SD
units
(5)

+7.20

(Table 6 continues on next page)
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Table 6 (continued)
NAICS Sample
Counterfactual and Components of
Price Change

II. Level of HHI^.5 increases by 1 SD
from sample mean
A. Productivity effect
1) on TFP growth
2) on output per hour growth
B. Implied effect of productivity
change on price
1) TFP change
2) q per hour change
C. Markup effect on price
(for given productivity)
1) TFP change
2) q per hour change
D. Sum of productivity and
markup effects on price
a) TFP basis=C.1-B.1
b) q per hour basis=C.2-B.2
c) from regression excluding
productivity effect

Source
:Table
(Regression)
(1)

change
amount
(2)

1

+12.0

3(2)
3(5)

.336
.480

.220
.268

.057
.331

.049
.216

4(4)
4(6)

-.182
-.209

-.115
-.133

-.031
-.107

-.030
-.104

4(4)
4(6)

.06
.072

.038
.046

-.023
.057

-.022
.055

-.122
-.137

-.077
-.087

-.053
-.050

-.052
-.049

-.120

-.076

-.0456

-.044

4(2)

change
in SD
units
(3)

SIC Sample
change
amount
(4)

change
in SD
units
(5)

+11.4

Table shows effects of assumed 1 standard deviation (SD) increases in the change and level of
concentration on productivity and prices. The sources of these effects are the relevant coefficients in
the regressions indicated in column (1).
The effects are shown as amounts (coefficients x 1 SD change in the concentration measure) in columns
(2) and (4) and in SD units of the outcome variable in columns (3) and (5). For example, the .161 in part
I column (3) line A. 1 means that the 1 SD increase in concentration change is associated with .246 log
percentage points extra MFP growth (col. (2), which is .161 SD extra TFP growth in the NAICS sample.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655762

39
holding productivity and input costs constant) of .108 SD (panel I, C. 1). The net implied effect (.085+.108) is the .023 shown on line a) of panel 1, D. a). This pattern of extra productivity and extra
markup netting out to a small price increase (.046 SD) holds for the SIC regressions. For comparison I
also show results for the “reduced form” regression of price on productivity (panel I, D .c).
Panel II does the same exercise for the level of concentration. Here we get consistently
favorable productivity effects and inconsistent price effects that sum to small price reductions in both
periods (-.077 SD and -.052 SD; panel II, D. a). The table does not include the interaction between the
two concentration effects (rising concentration also increases the average level), which would reduce or
essentially eliminate the already small positive price effects in panel I.
In short, the exercise tells of trivial net price effects arising from sometimes more sizeable
productivity and markup effects that roughly offset each other. This pattern has been in place for 30
years or more. If it hasn’t run its course by now, there are at least two important implications. One is
for the sources of increased concentration. Perhaps relaxed antitrust enforcement is part of the story,
but it is not the whole story.
Another, perhaps more important part of the story is the one anticipated by Harold Demsetz a
decade before the 1982 Merger Guidelines. It is that rising concentration is an outcome of competition
rather than a source of monopoly. Low cost firms will tend to grow, and as they replace higher cost
firms industry productivity metrics improve. One variant of this Demsetzian process with some support
in recent literature is that operating at large scale seems to have become a lower cost way of doing
business in some industries, perhaps because of information technology advances that lower the cost of
coordinating large organizations.
This Demsetzian interpretation is reinforced by examining margin changes independently of any
connection to market structure. Competition from low cost firms will tend to raise margins whether or
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not it also raises concentration. As long as those low cost firms remain infra-marginal, output price will
be unaffected and price-cost margins will widen along with the growth of the more efficient firms. I do
not have firm specific data here, but cross-industry data are consistent with this version of Demsetzian
competition: in the most recent period, all of the variety in margin growth reflects productivity
differences. None of it has anything to do with prices.
The results here have implications for further research. One involves measurement, especially of
capital. Except for removing some obvious outlier industries I have mainly taken existing industrial
statistics at face value. This may be risky. For an example, intangible capital, such as software, has
become increasingly important, but it is hard to measure, because there is no depreciable capital asset
on the user’s or vendor’s books. Instead intangible capital is typically produced with some risky current
expenditure, such as R&D. The difficulty of measuring intangible capital can affect the accuracy of
conventional price and productivity measures as well as margins. (Brynjolfsson et al, 2020). Specifically,
the measured capital stock will be understated. But the risky current expenditures producing this
capital ultimately have to be paid for in higher margins. One of the benign interpretations of increased
concentration (Bessen, 2017; Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014), is that IT intangibles are more effectively
deployed by large firms. If so, concentration and margins would increase together in IT using industries
for reasons unrelated to market power. Measurement issues like these need further work even if they
are only part of the story behind the patterns described in this paper (as argued in Syverson, 2017).
Industrial Organization economists have become comfortable relaxing part one of the canonical
competitive model, the part about price taking producers of identical goods. They have paid less
attention to part two. On the cost side more or less homogeneous firms and flat long run supply curves
reign if only by default. 46 One implication of the results here is that firm heterogeneity perhaps needs to

46

There is also a logical tension between differentiated products and undifferentiated producers.
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be taken more seriously. Another, from the business dynamism literature, is that the heterogeneities
will not disappear even over long horizons. The continual churn of firms and market shares implies that
industries are always populated by a mix of marginal and infra-marginal firms whose identities and
technologies change over time. The motivating examples of infra-marginal firms in Demsetz (1973)
were GM and IBM. Within the next decade both had lost that place and not because they were imitated
by rivals 47.
There is, finally, an implication for antitrust policy. Current policy is increasingly faulted for
being too relaxed about mergers and perhaps other kinds of horizontal and vertical cooperation among
firms. But the relaxation has not hurt consumers. On the other side, calls for tougher enforcement
entail a risk of reducing productivity without helping consumers.

GM lost share to more fuel efficient, smaller imports mainly from Japan. IBM lost to the switch from mainframes
to smaller more flexibly located machines.
47
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